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NARRATIVE REVIEW
Hospital preparedness in community measles
outbreaks*challenges and recommendations
for low-resource settings
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We have reviewed various strategies involved in containment of measles in healthcare facilities during
community outbreaks. The strategies that are more applicable to resource-poor settings, such as natural
ventilation, mechanical ventilation with heating and air-conditioning systems allowing unidirectional air-
flow, and protection of un-infected patients and healthcare workers (HCWs), have been examined.
Ventilation methods need innovative customization for resource-poor settings followed by validation and post-
implementation analysis for impact. Mandatory vaccination of all HCWs with two doses of measles-containing
vaccine, appropriate post-exposure prophylaxis of immunocompromised inpatients, and stringent admission
criteria for measles cases can contribute toward reduction of nosocomial and secondary transmission within
facilities.
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M
easles (rubeola) is a highly contagious viral ill-
ness with a considerable contribution to under-
5 child mortality across the globe. Though mass
vaccination has led to more successful control in two of
six WHO regions (the Americas and Western Pacific),
all six are committed to measles elimination (1). Stringent
measles control targets were set in 2010 by member states
of the World Health Assembly (]90% national and]80%
district measles immunization coverage, reducing annual
measles incidence to less than five cases per million, and
reducing measles-related deaths by 95% from 2000 to
2015) (1). GAVI Alliance funding to support measles immu-
nization with two doses of measles vaccine is available
for low- and low-middle-income countries. Although there
has been a considerable decline in global measles mortality
from an estimated 0.63 million deaths in 1990 to 0.13
million deaths in 2010 (2), a number of outbreaks have
been reported in the recent past from both developed and
developing countries. Some outbreaks have in fact occur-
red in populations with a high vaccination rate and have
been attributed to pockets of low-vaccination areas (3, 4).
Figure 1 shows countries reporting measles outbreaks
from 2009 to 2013 (519) and those reporting a high
number of measles cases till May 2013 (20). Although out-
breaks are distributed throughout the globe, most measles
deaths are reported from low-income countries (21).
Widespread community outbreaks in these regions result
in high patient influx in tertiary care hospitals where
over-crowding and breach in infection control practices
leads to nosocomial spread. Although, Center for Disease
Control’s (CDC) Healthcare Infection Control Advisory
Committee (HICPAC) have put forward definite recom-
mendations for the isolation of measles cases in hospitals
(22), these are not always easily applicable or feasible in
resource-poor settings where ventilation systems in exist-
ing hospital structures range from natural to previously
installed heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC)
to complex hybrids of both. In most facilities, natural
ventilation is the rule, with standard rooms and wards
consisting of windows, doors, and ceiling fan(s), without
HVAC or any ventilation ducts.
Hospitals in the midst of measles outbreaks
Measles cases present to tertiary care facilities with either
a prodrome of fever or the 3Cs (cough, coryza, and con-
junctivitis) fever with an exanthem or a post-infectious

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complication like pneumonia. In recent outbreaks, measles
has been seen not only in children but also in adults
(23, 24), increasing the margin of error for internists who
may be less likely to encounter and therefore recognize a
measles rash. Triage procedures in major hospitals rarely
consider infectious risks from prodromal patients to other
patients and hospital staff unless an outbreak triggers con-
cern among staff. This may lead to patients with possible
measles being admitted to general wards without any
infection control precautions triggering patient to patient
and patient to healthcare worker (HCW) spread. The risks
in multi-specialty tertiary care centers are multiplied by the
possibility of transmission to immunocompromised and
pregnant patients as well as to non-immune staff who may
in turn care for these high-risk patients. Several recent
community outbreaks of measles have led to nosocomial
outbreaks (25, 26).
Hospitals are advised to institute measures which
prevent the exponential spread of measles virus among
patients and HCWs. In this paper, measures for contain-
ment of measles virus are reviewed in light of challenges
faced by low-resource settings in instituting such mea-
sures and feasible alternative solutions are presented.
Methods
We have reviewed articles published in English in PubMed
related to measles in healthcare settings. In addition,
CDC/HICPAC documents, ASHRAE documents, and
related references were also searched for engineering con-
trols by a Google and Google Scholar search. PubMed
search was conducted from inception to July 2013 (except
for measles outbreaks where search was conducted from
2009 to 2013). The following search terms were employed:
PubMed*‘measlesoutbreaks’, ‘measleshealthcare’, ‘measles
nosocomial’, ‘measles infection control’, ‘airborne infec-
tion control’; Google*‘CDC/HICPAC/ASHRAE guide-
lines recommendations infection control airborne’; Google
Scholar*‘measles airborne infection control’, ‘measles
containment hospitals’. A total of 3,056 articles were
identified in PubMed, and an additional 25 documents
were retrieved on Google search, after removal of dup-
licates. After removal of cross-references, we reviewed
105 PubMed publications and CDC/HICPAC/ASHRAE
documents.
Records were reviewed by two authors independently
(SS and FM), and consensus was reached regarding
referencing by mutual agreement. Recommendations
have been made in light of expert opinion from senior
authors.
Measures for measles containment in
hospitals
As with other infection control programs, a measles con-
tainment action plan also has three elements: adminis-
trative controls, environmental controls, and personal
protective measures for staff. Figure 2 describes their
interrelationship and the components covered by these
elements.
Fig. 1. Measles reemergence in the world*community outbreaks 20092013 reported in PubMed. Gray areas show countries reporting
outbreaks (]1 measles outbreak) occurring between 2009 and 2013. Darker areas indicate large number of cases (1,000 cases)
reported by WHO in 2013, but no outbreaks reported in PubMed (English language) in the years 20092013.
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Measles containment in hospitals can be achieved by
satisfying the following operational conditions:
1. Early and accurate case diagnosis in the clinic or
emergency department (ED)
2. Prevention of transmission to hospital inpatients
and HCWs
3. Protection of HCWs and other hospital staff
4. Prevention of spread to visitors
Early and accurate case diagnosis in the ED
As febrile rashes and prodromal fevers in children and
adults are difficult to diagnose clinically, it is essential
that the diagnosis of airborne infections such as measles
and varicella are excluded before such patients are ad-
mitted to hospital wards. In an outbreak situation, this
becomes easier with contact histories. However, an on-
going measles outbreak does not preclude other causes
of infectious fevers. Influenza, infectious mononucleosis,
varicella, and other viral fevers may very well simulate
measles in the prodromal phase. It is therefore of fore-
most importance that physicians and nurses in ED and
outpatient clinics be able to recognize measles in the
prodromal phase. Moreover, in areas with good vaccine
coverage, measles may present with atypical findings
(modified measles) in young infants and in individuals
with a vaccination history (27). WHO case definition for
surveillance standards (28), which includes a physician-
suspected diagnosis, is therefore not specific and requi-
res laboratory confirmation. We recommend that a
laboratory confirmed diagnosis be made before hospital
admission in all cases who are not epidemiologically
confirmed (i.e. are not contacts of a laboratory confirmed
case). Measles containment plans would benefit from
urgent laboratory services to provide point-of-care rapid
tests, such as the measles IgM in oral fluid, in ED and
clinics.
Even with availability of rapid tests, the time between
presentation and diagnosis can be unaccounted for and
result in significant measles exposures of HCWs and
other ED patients (29). Hospitals can reduce this expo-
sure risk by mandating expedited triage and diagnosis in
all patients seen in clinics and EDs with a history of fever
(or current fever) with or without exanthema. Box 1
summarizes ED measures to prevent measles spread.
Fig. 2. Components of measles containment plan managed under different elements of infection control program.
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Box 1. Measures to reduce measles spread in ED
. Appropriate triage
. High index of suspicion in outbreak situations
. Expedited isolation for patient with suspected
measles
. Laboratory confirmation of diagnosis before
admission to hospital wards
. Measures for efficient transfer to ward to
decrease risk of spread in hospital corridors
Prevention of transmission to hospital inpatients
and HCWs
Prevention of transmission may be achieved by observing
the current CDC recommendation to vaccinate healthcare
staff (30) and isolate each case under airborne isolation
precautions (22). Patient isolation in measles must conti-
nue till 4 days after appearance of rash. Essentials of
patient isolation are summarized in Box 2.
Box 2. Admission of measles patient to hospital: Essen-
tial measures
. Isolation to a single room
. Appropriate ventilation of room (Airborne
infection isolation room*AIIR)
. Continuation of isolation until 4 days after rash
onset
Recommendations for airborne isolation
Airborne infections isolation rooms (AIIR) as recom-
mended by the CDC/HICPAC consist of a single isola-
tion room with mechanical ventilation in the form of an
industrial-grade high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA)
filter (with 99.99% efficiency, 12 air changes per hour*
ACH) (22) which also generates a pressure differential of
0.01-inch water-gauge (wg) or 2.5 Pa (American Institute
of Architects AIA criteria 2006) (31).
Installation and maintenance of these recommenda-
tions is not possible in all low-resource facilities.
Challenges of isolation in resource-poor settings
Patient isolation is a problem when facilities do not have
enough (or any) negative pressure rooms. Such hurdles
are commonly encountered in resource-poor settings in
Asia and Africa where a number of recent outbreaks have
occurred (7, 1015). Other challenges in resource-poor set-
tings may also hinder implementation of AIIR measures.
These include:
1. High cost of AIIR installation and maintenance
2. Lack of expertise to install and maintain the air
handling system
3. Poor or interrupted electrical power supply
4. Low awareness of infection control precautions
among HCWs
5. Lack of planning and poor administrative control
Given the difficulty in implementing ideal measures,
alternative solutions such as isolation wards, portable HEPA
filters, or even natural ventilation may be employed by
facilities. However, none of these measures have been
recommended by regulatory authorities such as HPA,
APIC, or CDC/HICPAC.
Appropriate alternatives as reviewed below must
satisfy the following ventilation prerequisites (essential
for airborne isolation):
1. Dilution ventilation to reduce contagion inside the
room
2. Filtration to remove contagion outside the venti-
lated facility
3. Pressure management (negative pressure as above to
minimize leakageof infectedair toothercleanerareas)
Facilities employing alternative means are advised to
get their containment plans approved by engineering and
infection control professionals to ensure the efficiency of
adopted methods.
Methods of isolation and environmental regulation
Isolation methods must take into account the existing
hospital ventilation systems. Many hospitals in resource-
poor settings do not have HVAC systems installed. Some
facilities with installed central HVAC systems may also
not be designed to institute AIIR as emergency measures.
The following are strategies that may be employed while
monitoring for efficiency.
Strategies for facilities without HVAC
Natural ventilation
Natural ventilation has been proven as an effective
method of removing airborne infectious agents (32, 33).
Natural ventilation simply involves opening doors and
windows to external ambient air. This alone can im-
prove room ventilation to 28 ACH (32) which is more
than twice the recommended ACH for airborne isola-
tion rooms. This strategy has not been applied widely
to hospitals. Natural ventilation can be integrated into
hospital buildings without HVAC to achieve dilution of
airborne contagion either at the design stage or changes
can be made later as per requirement, though cost is
much lower if it is part of initial planning. Filtration
of air is not required, since contagion discharged into
outer air is also naturally diluted; however, open
windows designed to achieve dilution must face a
cordoned-off area with no traffic to minimize contam-
ination. The challenge is to achieve and maintain
unidirectional airflow so that air moves from the patient
Sadia Shakoor et al.
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room to the outside thus diluting the infectious parti-
cles in the environment. This may be achieved by
combining the natural ventilation mode with exhaust
fans (the hybrid model) so as to facilitate airflow
direction from patient room to the outside. Negative
pressure may also be achieved through this model (33,
34), although the recommendation of 2.5 Pa pressure
differential has been made for mechanically ventilated
closed spaces and will therefore not apply to naturally
ventilated rooms. Whether same pressure differentials
apply to naturally ventilated spaces is not known. Figure
3 shows a suggested plan for a naturally ventilated single
room.
It has also been stated that ambient temperatures may
be too high or too cold for allowing open doors and
windows (35). Fortunately, most low-resource settings are
situated in the tropics, where too-cold weather is a rarity
and warm temperatures are the norm. In most low-
resource settings with high ambient temperatures (Africa
and South Asia), hospitals are not air-conditioned to cool
temperatures and so natural ventilation should remain an
acceptable measure. An additional problem may be insect
control in tropical regions. This can be controlled by
maintaining good hygiene measures and use of impreg-
nated bed nets, door and window netting, repellent, or
insect electrocutor lamps.
Recommendation: Natural ventilation in measles iso-
lation rooms or wards is an adequate, low-cost method
to prevent dissemination of measles in hospitals.
To facilitate airflow direction from room to outside,
exhaust fans should be installed (hybrid approach).
The model measles isolation ward
The idea of isolation wards is an old one. Studies dated
as far back as the 1940s mention measles isolation wards
(36). As hospital constructions improved to house both im-
munocompetent and immunocompromised patients across
multiple disciplines into single rooms or smaller wards
units, and as measles (and other infectious) epidemics
decreased, this method fell into disuse. Recently, such
measures have been used for influenza containment in
hospitals (37, 38). However, no studies have shown ade-
quate ventilation rates in such wards. Figure 4 shows a
model plan for a measles isolation ward. The basic plan
resembles an isolated naturally ventilated room.
That a measles patient does not harbor any additional
airborne infections other patients in the bay can be sus-
ceptible to is an essential element in this plan. However,
many febrile rashes may remain undiagnosed. Endemic
fevers such as dengue may be confused with early mea-
sles. Therefore, it is imperative that all cases admitted
to such wards be either epidemiologically confirmed or
Fig. 3. Preferable plan for a naturally ventilated room in a facility without HVAC. Patient bed position in the middle (preferred)
Windows at either bed end facilitate air transmission. Walls on outside (without the room) show cordoned-off area with no traffic.
Cordoned area must facilitate air passage to maintain dilutional effect. An exhaust placed at point A (upward arrow) will create
negative pressure producing a hybrid model.
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laboratory-confirmed measles cases. Such arrangement
requires ancillary laboratory facilities which can assist
physicians in patient cohorting decisions and support
rapid diagnosis (through confirmatory IgM ELISA) as a
necessary adjunct to effective isolation wards. Patients
who have been cohorted on measles wards with con-
firmed measles infection do not need to wear specific
personal protective equipment (PPE) to reduce person-
to-person transmission of the virus between patients.
However, HCWs or visitors to such a ward are recom-
mended to use airborne precautions (i.e. an N-95-fitted
mask) for routine interactions with patients on that ward.
Cohort nursing of such a ward will also be feasible for
healthcare facilities.
Recommendation: Measles wards may be an adequate
measure for hospitals with space available. However,
patients must be confirmed measles cases with no
alternative diagnoses being entertained. Patients must
also not harbor any infections that may be a risk to
other patients on the ward (in which case, single room
isolation is preferable). Engineering personnel should
be advised to document the control of airflow direction.
Standard precautions should be followed by patients
on this ward; airborne precautions should be used by
visitors and clinicians entering the ward.
Installation of HVAC
HVAC systems need to take into account building design
and construction (39). In already constructed facilities,
it would therefore be impossible to install HVAC without
renovation and reconstruction. Added to this would be
the costs of installation, energy supply, and maintenance
of equipment for optimal efficiency (40). Such costs are
not feasible even for tertiary-care hospitals in developing
countries, since these already operate on minimal budget
which mostly goes into provision of basic medical services,
laboratory, radiology, pharmacy services, and bed space.
Facilities operating on a larger budget may consider
renovating for HVAC systems, especially when prioritiz-
ing for patient comfort and safety.
Recommendation: Installation of HVAC in construc-
ted facilities without ducted ventilation systems is
costly, and cannot be recommended as the primary
measure for measles containment.
Fig. 4. Example of an isolation ward for measles: prerequisites.
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Hospital buildings with HVAC but no isolation
rooms
Space constraints and discontinuous electrical power-
supply may render the ideal recommended by the CDC
impractical for facilities in resource-poor settings. More-
over, ducted-HEPA filter installations may not be present
in hospitals which have HVAC. Temporary measures for
AIIR may need to be made available in such facilities as
spread may be facilitated among patients on the same
ward/floor in such buildings via common ducts.
Exhausting infectious air to outside through an
industrial-grade HEPA filter
A single room with ventilating duct may be modified to
an AIIR attaching an industrial-grade (99.999% effi-
ciency) HEPA filter via a connecting duct to an existing
window. Similar models have been used by the EPA in
evaluating HEPA filters in removing particulate air from
rooms (41). Windows that are wider than the connecting
duct exhaust port may be modified so the open area is
sealed and supports the duct. This window may open to
the outside or the hospital corridor with patient traffic,
as discharged air is cleaned through the filter. Any other
ducts which exhaust air to other rooms/wards or the
outside should be sealed. The same HEPA filter will also
create a negative pressure which will allow for air entry
when the door opens. However, doors must be kept closed
at most times and fresh air would then need to be in-
troduced via a ceiling or side-wall duct. An anteroom for
adjustment of airflow upon opening room doors is ideal.
Figure 5 shows the temporary installation plan.
Pressure differential need not be monitored at all times
although the temporary design should be tested for
negative pressure and air seal after installation.
Recommendation: In facilities with existing ventilation
ducts, an industrial-grade HEPA filter may be installed
in a ‘window-design’ to achieve temporary AIIR. Cost is
a major impediment in installation of this feature.
Portable HEPA filters
In hospitals with space constraints, portable air filters
with high efficiency may be used to supplement an exist-
ing HVAC system. If an HVAC system with controlled
environment does not exist, adding a portable HEPA
filter is of little value.
True HEPA filters remove 99.9799.999% of airborne
(B0.3 microns) particles (42). This efficiency is not
Fig. 5. Creating a temporary AIIR room. Industrial-grade HEPA filter attached via a duct to sealed window. Arrows show clean air
(supply into and exhaust from room). Ducts built-in for exhaust air must be sealed for the design to work.
Measles in hospitals in low-resource settings
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matched by portable filters (43, 44). Moreover, the air
flow rate has to be matched for space. There is also no
guarantee that all of the room air is drawn in by the
portable filter and cleansed. Portable filters may only be
used as adjuncts and not as standalone HEPA filters (21).
Since such filters are only adjuncts in single-room spaces,
they can certainly not be used in isolation wards.
An exception to this may be made when patients
placed in wards cannot be moved and develop measles
and/or another airborne infection. In such situations,
plastic sheets may be adjusted around the patient beds to
achieve a tight seal which is difficult to attain practi-
cally (45). Two entry points are required: one to allow for
the HCW to pass inside and out (re-sealable) and another
to place a portable HEPA filter. There are clear dis-
advantages to this arrangement including space limita-
tions for adequate ventilation of HEPA machinery, noise
generated (which increases at high flow rates), and
influence on pre-existing airflow in the ward (46). We
reiterate that this arrangement is temporary and is not an
adequate solution or strategy to isolate measles patients
routinely.
Recommendation: Portable HEPA filters cannot be
recommended as standalone devices to remove parti-
culate infectious material, and are only adjuncts to a
mechanical HVAC system. Use should be restricted to
emergent situations and sized for space.
Personalized ventilation
An innovative alternative is personalized ventilation (PV)
to reduce spread of measles to other hospital inpatients.
PV involves restricting the ventilation system to one patient
and employs high-speed air jets through an air-supply
pillow or a retractable hood design (47). Figure 6 shows
the retractable hood design. PV has however, not been
shown to be practically effective in larger studies, and
hood designs may not be acceptable to many pediatric
patients and parents since they restrict activity and may
compromise patient preferences. Moreover, the pillow
design is also limited in that it requires the patient to be
bed-bound. Although not feasible for integration into
hospitals at this time, it is hoped that PV methods will
improve in future and will be a welcome introduction in
many EDs. Another important use for such systems may
be when transporting patients with measles from one
hospital area to another. A retractable hood attached to a
mobile bed is ideal for such situations.
Recommendation: Current PV methods cannot be
recommended for use in low-cost settings at this time.
However, such methods may become easier to use in
future.
Table 1 summarizes applications for natural, mechani-
cal, and PV systems for measles containment in resource-
poor hospital settings.
Fig. 6. An example of a retractable hood over a patient to contain infectious exhaust particles from the patient. Such measures have not
been applied practically, however, they hold potential for future use as an airborne or droplet infection control measure.
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Table 1. Summary of various ventilation systems for measles control in resource-poor facilities
Ventilation
systems Without HVAC With HVAC
Natural ventilation
- Measles ward
- Single room
Installation of new HVAC Temporary isolation rooms
with installable true HEPA
filters
Portable HEPA filters Personalized ventilation Negative pressure single
rooms with 12 ACH
and duct-installed
industrial grade HEPA
Pros - Easily achievable in
facilities with space
available
- Low cost
- Very high efficiency
- Good air dilutional effect
- Exhaust fans (high-power)
integrated into system
(hybrid model) will achieve
negative pressure
- Insect protection achieved
by installing window-nets
- Increased patient
comfort
- Temperature control and
better allergen, dust,
and insect control
- Good temporary
measure for hospitals
with HVAC
- Rooms may be created
with both negative
pressure and filtered
exhaust while
maintaining patient
comfort with HVAC
- Temporary measure
in case patients who
cannot be moved
develop measles
- Future application as
means of airborne
isolation while
transporting patients
within facilities
- Ideal and
recommended by
CDC/HICPAC
Cons - Directional airflow possible
but may be problematic;
no control over airflow
direction
- Requires wide open
spaces and area cordoned
off against traffic outside
- No control over natural
weather conditions
- Temperature control may
be an issue
- High cost of
construction plus cost of
maintenance
- Requires renovation and
reconstruction
- High and continuous
energy supply
- Backup required for
electric power failures
which may not be
available to resource-
poor facilities
- High cost
- Require maintenance
- Require addition of a
flex duct and sealable
window frames
- Require cleaning
between uses
- Low efficiency
- Must be sized for
space, so not always
applicable
- High cost
- Require maintenance
- Require cleaning
after discontinuation
of use
- Very early stage of
development
- Noise, eye dryness, issues
with patient comfort
- Need of ceiling-installed
duct for fresh air inlet (so
current designs more
applicable to facilities with
HVAC)
- Expensive installation
and maintenance
- Require continuous
electric supply
- Bioengineer
monitoring for facilities
with frequent power
failures
Recommendation Preferred method in
hospitals without HVAC.
However, plan must be
approved by infection
control before
implementation.
Cannot be recommended
as requires high cost and
disruption by renovation.
Preferred method of
temporary isolation in
facilities with HVAC but
without ideal AII rooms.
Cannot be
recommended as
routine measure. Not a
preferred temporary
measure.
No recommendation can be
made as of now.
Recommended
standard
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The method employed in a healthcare setting depends
upon available resources such as space for measles isola-
tion wards and natural ventilation, or adequate engi-
neering and environmental controls in the facility for
adjustable industrial-grade HEPA filters and PV systems.
Cost, however, is a confounder in all circumstances.
Natural ventilation is more suited to resource limited
settings as a measure of airborne infection control since it
is both less costly and more efficient at removing airborne
particles. Isolation wards may be more suited to facilities
with no space constraints.
Protection of hospital staff
HCWs are at increased risk of contracting measles (48).
Recent outbreaks affecting adults in large numbers have
prompted renewed efforts to promote HCW vaccination
against measles. CDC recommends two doses of a measles-
containing vaccine (MCV) 4 weeks apart (30). This recom-
mendation applies to all HCWs lacking evidence of
immunity, which is either physician diagnosed measles in
the past, or a positive measles IgG. Given that both
may be unavailable in HCWs working in low-income
settings, all HCW can be safely vaccinated with an MCV.
Either MMR or MMRV may be used, and the latter is
superior due to added protection against varicella. How-
ever, vaccination against measles alone may be consid-
ered in settings where varicella, rubella, and mumps are
infrequently seen.
Personnel requiring vaccination include all hospital
staff who may have direct contact with patients. These
should therefore also include housekeeping staff, phlebo-
tomists, dietitians, language translators in multi-ethnic
setups, pharmacists, physiotherapists, radiographers, re-
ceptionists, etc.
In hospitals with 100% vaccination rates in hospital
staff, use of PPE may not be necessary. The costs of an
N-95 and N-100 respirator along with the added cost of
fit testing makes these measures difficult to implement.
Unless used in conjunction with artificial ventilation rooms
with adequate ACH rates, these are not good enough
standalone measures of protection. Therefore, the authors
recommend a vaccination-for-all approach in preference
to the use of PPE to protect HCWs. Protective vaccination
and doses required are emphasized in Box 3.
Box 3. Recommendation to protect healthcare workers
against measles (30)
. Two does of measles-containing vaccine (MCV)
4 weeks apart
Protection of visitors
Visitors to healthcare facilities are also at risk if they are
non-immune. While testing and treating every hospital
visitor is impossible to say the least, in the interests
of preventive measures, visitors can be educated/advised
at every contact by hospital staff to get vaccinated in a mea-
sles outbreak setting. Vaccination messages in the form of
billboards, clinic flyers, and periodic hospital announce-
ments are recommended to mold public opinion in favor of
vaccinations. This may however, be problematic in popula-
tions with religious contentions against vaccinations. In such
cases, private clinic consultations may be more adequate.
Visitors and attendants of measles patients, who are
isolated in measles wards or single rooms may benefit
from PPE usage. N-95 masks provided to visitors will
constitute adequate PPE in such cases.
Lastly, a simple measure such as restricting the number
of visitors per patient (which may be the case in culturally
close-knitted environments) is likely to prevent spread of
measles.
Post-exposure measures
While maintaining that infectious spread can be prevented
in hospitals by instituting all the above measures, hospitals
should also be prepared for the eventuality of measles
exposures. Post-exposure investigations should be under-
taken as soon as a measles exposure event has been
identified. Infection control teams should be mobilized
for line listing of all exposed patients and personnel. All
individuals, who come into contact with the index patient
5 days (maximum duration of prodrome1) prior to and
4 days after measles rash onset are at risk of developing
measles (49). Exposed individuals need to be protected,
unless known to have received two doses of an MCV at
least 4 weeks apart in the past, or have had laboratory-
confirmed measles in the past, or have evidence of a
positive measles IgG. However, seeking evidence of past
infection by doing a measles IgG is not recommended
before instituting post-exposure measures (50). Exposed
non-immune individuals, who are immunocompetent
should receive measles vaccine immediately. Vaccination
as a post-exposure method is effective up to 72 h after
exposure (50). Immunocompromised and pregnant indi-
viduals as well as young infants (less than 6 months of age)
must be protected with parenteral immunoglobulins (50).
For school-going pediatric patients, physicians should
recommend booster vaccinations for possibly exposed
class- and play mates. Table 2 reviews types of immuno-
globulins that may be used for measles post-exposure
prophylaxis, their advantages and disadvantages (51).
Immunoglobulins need to be administered within 6 days
of exposure to be effective for immunocompromised
individuals. Effectiveness, however, is under review and
may vary with type of preparation and dosage used (52).
Stocking the pharmacy
In outbreak situations, measles exposures and nosoco-
mial outbreak risks dictate that hospital pharmacies have
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a ready supply of MCVs (measles vaccine, measles
rubella, measlesmumpsrubella, or measlesmumps
rubellavaricella). In addition, hospitals will also benefit
from stocking immunoglobulin preparations to avoid
delays in instituting post-exposure prophylaxis to the
immunocompromised.
Role of infection control teams in policy-
making, and implementation
Recommendations laid out above underline the impor-
tance of policy-making and implementation in hospitals.
Administrative controls, following standard precautions
in hospitals including appropriate patient placement upon
admission are essential elements to both good infection
control practice and measles containment. Every tertiary-
care center should be encouraged to prepare for outbreak
responsiveness not only by pharmacy stockpiling and
creating space for measles wards but also formulating
and supporting infection control taskforces especially
designed to oversee and bear the workload of managing
hospital response. Hospital policies in existence can be
supplemented by educational activities carried out by
such teams. In addition to within-facility containment, hos-
pitals in community outbreak situations have an added
responsibility to actively participate in submitting rele-
vant information on number of cases and their areas of
residence to national and regional disease early warning
surveillance (DEWS) systems or else in absence of a func-
tional DEWS inform health ministry or WHO autho-
rities. Zero-reporting, in addition to advocacy through
social media, can lead to a concerted effort to institute
appropriate and timely mop-up vaccination at commu-
nity level.
Conclusions
Community outbreaks of measles often inundate hospitals
with cases. These cases may lead to nosocomial outbreaks
if hospitals are not prepared to admit measles patients
under airborne isolation precautions or if HCWs are un-
vaccinated. In the absence of ideal recommended AIIR
measures, hospitals in resource-poor settings need to devise
appropriate and sustainable infection control strategies to
prevent measles transmission. Naturally ventilated single
rooms or measles wards are adequate for such isolation
measures and preferable to temporary measures. Manda-
tory HCW vaccination against measles would decrease the
risk of transmission and prevent long absences from work
due to sickness. Hospital policy must ensure that adequate
prevention measures are instituted in outbreak situations.
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Table 2. Immunoglobulin preparations used for measles post-exposure prophylaxis
Preparation Recommended dose Advantages Disadvantages
Intramuscular
immunoglobulin
(IGIM)
0.5 mL/kg
(0.25 mL/kg for
immunocompetent
patients)
 Can be used if 72 h have
elapsed since exposure
(as opposed to vaccines)
 High (90%) IgG fraction
 Lesser adverse events than
with IGIV
 May be used for
immunocompromised household
contacts of patients as well
 Lower cost than IGIV
(16 USD per 0.5 mLa)
 Cannot be used in patients with coagulation
disorders (hence in immunocompromised
patients with thrombocytopenia who cannot
receive vaccine)
 Measles vaccine (and MMRV) cannot be
given for 6 months afterward
 Adverse reactions: Local pain at injection site,
anaphylaxis (rare)
Intravenous
immunoglobulin
(IGIV)
400 mg/kg  Recommended for severely
immunocompromised patients
as post-exposure prophylaxis
 High (95%) IgG fraction
 Can be used if 72 h have
elapsed since exposure
 Measles vaccine (and MMRV) cannot be
given for 8 months afterward
 Costlier than IGIM (22 USD per 400 mg)b
 Adverse reactions to infusion are commoner
than with IGIM (e.g. anaphylaxis, risk of
thrombosis)
 Caution against use in patients with
compromised renal and cardiac patients
Subcutaneous
immunoglobulin
(IGSC)
 No recommendations regarding IGSC use as a post-exposure measure. However,
patients already receiving IGSC at a dose of 200 mg/kg and above may be protected
against active measles infection
aCDC, wholesale cost 2013 (http://www.cdc.gov/hepatitis/IG-HBIG_Sources.htm); bhttp://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/meetings/downloads/
min-archive/min-jun12.pdf
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